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Abstract 
It is frequently asserted that financialisation has contributed to the decline in the wage share. 
This paper provides a theoretical clarification and a systematic empirical investigation. We 
identify four channels through which financialisation can affect the wage share: (1) enhanced 
exit options of firms; (2) rising price mark-ups due to financial overhead costs for businesses; 
(3) increased competition on capital markets and shareholder value orientation; and (4) the 
role of household debt in increasing workers’ financial vulnerability and undermining their 
class consciousness. The paper compiles a comprehensive set of empirical measures of 
financialisation and uses it to test these hypotheses with a panel regression of 14 OECD 
countries over the 1992-2014 period. We find strong evidence for negative effects of financial 
liberalisation and financial payments of non-financial corporations on the wage share that are 
in the same order of magnitude as the effects of globalisation. 
 
Keywords: financialisation; income distribution; political economy. 
 
JEL codes: E25; F65;  
 
Acknowledgements: We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Ewa Karwowski, 
Glenn Lauren Moore, Rafael Wildauer and Niall Reddy on an earlier draft of this paper. All 
remaining mistakes are ours. 
 
Address for correspondence: Karsten Kohler, Kingston University London, KT1 2EE, 
Kingston upon Thames, UK, e-mail: k_koehler@ymail.com; Alexander Guschanski, 
University of Greenwich, SE10 9LS, London, UK, e-mail:  a.guschanski@greenwich.ac.uk; 
Engelbert Stockhammer, Kingston University London, KT1 2EE, Kingston Upon Thames, 
UK, e-mail: e.stockhammer@kingston.ac.uk.  
 
 (*) This discussion paper is published at the authors' request in place of How does 
financialisation affect functional income distribution? A theoretical clarification and 
empirical assessment (2015-5).  
2 
1. Introduction 
The last four decades have been characterised by drastic changes in the distribution of income 
between wages and profits. Figure 1 shows the average of the adjusted wage share
1
 for 14 
member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
from 1970 to 2014.
2
 The wage share moves countercyclical because profits decline in 
recessions, while wage incomes are more stable due to fixed wage contracts. Noteworthy, 
however, is the long-term trend: between 1975, when the average wage share peaked at 72 % 
of gross domestic product (GDP), and 2014 there was a nine percentage point decline. In the 
same time period, we observe an ‘unprecedented expansion of financial activities, rapid 
growth of financial profits, permeation of economy and society by financial relations, and 
domination of economic policy by the concerns of the financial sector’ (Lapavitsas 2013, p. 3) 
– a phenomenon often dubbed ‘financialisation’, which has given rise to a substantial 
academic literature. Financialisation has many dimensions, including financial deregulation, 
securitisation, shareholder value orientation, and increasing household debt. Most studies on 
financialisation are concerned with its effects on firms’ investment decisions (Stockhammer 
2004; Orhangazi 2008; Tori and Onaran 2017), corporate governance and employment 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000), the changing role of financial assets and liabilities for 
households (Hein 2012, chap. 5), and the implications of financial deregulation on financial 
stability (Lapavitsas 2009; Guttman 2016). The issue of income distribution is often touched 
upon, but rarely analysed systematically. Palley (2007)
3
 and Lapavitsas (2013)
4
 assert that 
financialisation has contributed to the decline in the wage share, but fail to identify 
mechanisms and do not provide econometric evidence. Hein (2015) presents the most 
elaborate theoretical discussion of the impact of financialisation on the wage share from a 
Kaleckian perspective. Jayadev (2007), Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), Alvarez (2015), 
Dünhaupt (2016), Wood (2017), and Stockhammer (2017) offer econometric evidence on the 
                                                 
1
 The adjusted wage share includes imputed payments of self-employed workers. 
2
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USA. 
3
 “Economists have identified multiple factors behind the stagnation of wages and the growth of income 
inequality […]. Those factors include the erosion of unions, the minimum wage, and labor market solidarity; 
globalization and trade; immigration; skill-biased technical change; and rising CEO pay […]. However, such 
analysis tends to treat these factors as independent of each other. The financialization thesis maintains that many 
of these factors should be linked and interpreted as part of a new economic configuration that has been explicitly 
promoted by financial sector interests” (Palley 2007, p. 11-12). 
4
 “The divergence between [labour productivity and hourly real wages] is a further indication of the worsening 
position of labour in the course of financialisation” (Lapavitsas 2013, p. 190). 
3 
effect of financialisation on functional income distribution.
5
 However, these studies tend to 
focus only on one measure of financialisation, which does not do justice to its 
multidimensional character and runs the risk of omitting important channels. Using only a 
single measure of financialisation in regression analyses may be misleading, as the different 
dimensions of financialisation are likely to be correlated. Moreover, there are no cross-
country studies that take into account the time period after the Great Recession (2009).   
 
 
Data source: AMECO.  
Note: The solid line is the unweighted average wage share over 14 OECD countries. The dotted lines are the unweighted 
average plus/minus one standard deviation. The wage share is defined as the share of wage income in GDP at factor costs. 
The adjusted wage share includes the imputed income of self-employed workers.  
 
The aim of this paper is theoretical clarification as well as empirical evaluation. We argue that 
financialisation affects income distribution by four different channels that require distinct 
empirical measures: (1) increased exit options for capital due to financial globalisation; this is 
based on models of bargaining in which exit options determine bargaining power. (2) 
Increased financial payments for non-financial businesses; this is based on mark-up pricing 
theories that postulate financial cost-sensitive mark-ups. (3) Increased competition on capital 
markets; this has been put forward by neo-Marxian authors and by the critical shareholder 
                                                 
5
 Some studies also analyse the effect of financialisation on measures of personal income distribution, such as 
the Gini coefficient (Kus 2012; Jaumotte and Buitron 2015), top income shares (Flaherty 2015; Jaumotte and 
Buitron 2015), and earnings dispersion (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). 
Figure 1: Adjusted wage share, 1970-2014, (unweighted) average over 14 OECD countries 
4 
value literature. (4) Increased household debt; this is an under-theorised area, where 
heterodox economists and Cultural Political Economy have made contributions.  
 
Hypotheses about the relation between financialisation and the wage share can be found in 
different theoretical approaches within heterodox Political Economy. It is not always possible 
to associate one hypothesis strictly to a single theoretical tradition. Bargaining power plays a 
role in Marxian and Kaleckian theory, but also in mainstream economics accounting for 
imperfect competition. Mark-up pricing is often associated with the work of Kaleckians, but 
can be found in post-Keynesian and Sraffian economics in general. Therefore, we prefer the 
term channel rather than 'theory' to distinguish the different hypotheses.  
 
We have compiled a broad data set of financialisation variables for OECD countries. The 
empirical contribution of the paper is to econometrically test these four mechanisms with a 
panel analysis of 14 OECD countries for the period 1992 to 2014, and thus to assess the 
empirical validity of the theoretical channels through which financialisation impacts on 
functional income distribution. Thereby, the paper also contributes to our understanding of the 
causes behind the recent surge in inequality. Our main finding is that there are strong negative 
effects of financial liberalisation and financial payments of non-financial corporations on the 
wage share. Taken together, the effects of financialisation are in a similar order of magnitude 
as the effects of globalisation. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses theoretical hypotheses and summarises 
empirical studies about the effect of financialisation on functional income distribution. In 
section 3, the econometric method is outlined, and variable definitions and data sources are 
introduced. Section 4 presents econometric results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Determinants of functional income distribution and financialisation: theoretical 
channels and empirical findings 
Financialisation has been first and foremost analysed within the heterodox theoretical 
tradition of Political Economy.
6
 This approach starts from the assumption that power relations 
are pervasive in production and market exchange. The distribution of income between profits 
                                                 
6
 Van der Zwan (2014) and Epstein (2015) provide summaries of the literature. Some neoclassical authors 
acknowledge the ‘growth of finance’ (Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013), but do not use the concept of 
financialisation. Admati (2017) is a recent exception, who discusses negative effects of financialisation on 
corporate governance and economic stability. 
5 
and wages should thus be regarded as the outcome of power relations rather than technology 
as in pure neoclassical theory. In formal bargaining models firms are assumed to operate in 
oligopolistic markets in which they can appropriate rents whose distribution depends on the 
relative bargaining position of firms and workers (see the short-run model in Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2003, for a representative piece of a sizeable literature). Both sides have an interest 
in concluding the negotiations and the split of the value added will depend on the exit options 
of the parties. For example an increase in unemployment benefits would improve the exit 
options and thereby the bargaining power of workers, and real wages would rise. If the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than one, a rise in wages would 
increase the wage share.
7
 Bargaining power is thus a concept that is consistent with Marxian 
and some versions of Kaleckian and Sraffian theory, but also with the non-market clearing 
versions of neoclassical and New Keynesian economics. However, mainstream versions of 
bargaining theory, such as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), typically assume that in the long-
run there is a fully elastic supply of firms that are eager to enter the market, which will 
eventually drive profits down and shift the wage share back to its previous level. This view 
basically re-establishes the market-clearing approach to distribution in the long-run and is not 
shared by heterodox Political Economy, in which imperfect competition is considered a 
structural feature of capitalist economies. 
 
We identify four theoretical hypotheses on the effect of financialisation on the wage share in 
the Political Economy literature: (1) enhanced exit options of capital due to financial 
globalisation; (2) rising pricing mark-ups due to financial overhead costs for firms; (3) 
increased competition on capital markets and shareholder value orientation; and (4) the role of 
household debt in increasing workers’ financial vulnerability and undermining their class 
consciousness 
 
2.1 Financial globalisation and the exit options of capital 
Models of bargaining have originally focused on labour market institutions (LMI) to explain 
the decline in the wage share (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Darcillon (2015) shows 
that financialisation partly explains the erosion and decentralisation of trade union density, 
employment protection legislation, and bargaining coverage. In his view shareholder value 
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 Rowthorn (1999) summarises evidence that the elasticity of substitution is less than one. 
6 
orientation and short-termism change industrial relations towards a more deregulated and less 
unionised labour market. 
 
Several contributions claim that financialisation also directly affects bargaining power as it 
increases the exit options for capital. Financial liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s and 
thus higher capital mobility is regarded as one of key developments of financialisation (ILO 
2008, chap. 2; Stockhammer 2013). Harrison (2002) and Jayadev (2007) argue that increasing 
capital account openness has contributed to the declining wage share through worsening 
labour’s bargaining power due to capital’s increased ability to relocate production. The power 
struggle in this channel takes place between industrial capital and workers. Harrison (2002) 
reports a positive effect of capital controls on the wage share for a sample of over 100 
countries between 1962-1997. In a similarly large panel over the period 1972-1995, Jayadev 
(2007) finds that capital account openness exerts a statistically significant and robust negative 
effect on the wage share. The ILO (2008, pp. 50-52) has linked a de facto measure of 
financial globalisation, foreign assets plus foreign liabilities as a share of GDP, to a declining 
wage share through an erosion of workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis capital. This 
hypothesis has been empirically investigated by Stockhammer (2009, 2017) and the ILO 
(2011, chap. 3). Stockhammer (2009) analyses the effects of financial globalisation, trade 
globalisation, and labour market institutions but also technology variables for a sample of 15 
OECD countries over the period 1982-2003. The negative effect of financial globalisation is 
statistically significant in a within-estimation with 5-year averages, but statistically 
insignificant in a first difference estimation. ILO (2011, chap. 3) reports statistically 
significant negative effects of financial globalisation on the wage share for a sample of 16 
high-income countries over the 1981-2005 period. Stockhammer (2017) offers an analysis for 
a broader sample of 71 developing and advanced countries for the time period 1980-2000. He 
finds that financial globalisation and trade openness have the strongest negative effect on 
wage shares. Lastly, IMF (2017, chap. 3) reports a negative effect of financial globalisation 
on the wage share in a sample of 49 countries between 1991-2014.  
 
Some authors suggest a different channel how financialisation enhances the exit options of 
capital. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) present an econometric study with industry level 
data for the USA (1970-2008). Their central financialisation variable is the ratio of financial 
receipts of non-financial corporations (including interest income, dividends, and capital gains) 
to business receipts, which is supposed to capture firm’s ability to make profits without 
7 
employing workers. They find that ‘increased dependence on earnings through financial 
channels tends to decrease labor’s share of total income in the long run’ (Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013, p. 1306). Alvarez (2015) is one of the few papers that estimate the 
wage share using French firm-level data. He employs two financialisation variables of which 
one, net financial income (including interest income, dividends, and capital gains), is 
discussed within a bargaining framework similar to Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey’s argument. 
He finds a robust negative impact of net financial income on the wage share in all 
specifications. Table 1 gives an overview of the existing econometric studies that investigate 
the effect of financialisation on functional income distribution.
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Study Dependent 
variable 
Main explanatory variables Estimation Methods Sample  Findings for financialisation 
variables Financialisation Non-financialisation 
Harrison 2002 WS CAPCON KL, Y, FX, OPEN, CC, GC, 
FDI 
FE; IV; 5YA;  
long-diff 
N > 100 
T: 1960-1997 
CAPCON: positive & 
significant 
 
Jayadev 2007 WS CAO, LRIR TXT, OPEN, CC, GC FE;5YA N > 100  
T: 1972-1995 
CAO: negative & significant  
LRIR: positive & significant 
Stockhammer 2009 WS FINGLOB, LRIR ICT, KL, OPEN, TW, UD, 
PMR, EPL, TOT, BRR, INV  
5YA (with FE);5YA 
(with FE2); FD 
N = 15  
T: 1982-2003 
FINGLOB: negative & 
significant 
ILO 2011 WS FINGLOB KL, OPEN, UD, BRR, TW, 
EPL, YW, OW, Y, FX, LRIR 
 FE N = 16 
T: 1981-2005 
FINGLOB: positive & 
significant 
Hein and Schoder 2011 PS INTPAY U, CPI, GRW ADL (in FD) 1. N = 1 (USA)  
    T: 1963-2007 
 2. N = 1(GER) 
    T: 1963-2007  
INTPAY: positive & 
significant 
Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2013 
WS FI UD, CI, COL, WW, ICE, SI, 
DEPR, IMP 
ECM (with FE2) 1. N = 35 (Industry-level    
data, USA) 
    T: 1970-1997 
2. N = 40 (Industry-level 
data, USA)  
    T: 1998-2008 
FI: negative & significant 
 
Alvarez 2015 Compensation 
of employees 
over total 
assets 
INTPAY, 
FININC 
FA, EXREV, E, VA, EBIT FE; FD N = 6980 (firm-level)  
T: 2004 – 2013 
INTPAY: negative & 
significant  
FININC: negative & 
significant 
Table 1: Econometric studies on financialisation and functional income distribution 
9 
Dünhaupt 2016 WS DIVPAY, 
INTPAY 
OPEN, FDI, PM, U, UD, STR, 
GC 
FE2; 
FD 
N = 13 
T: 1986 – 2007 
DIVPAY, 
DIVPAY+INTPAY: negative 
& significant 
INTPAY: negative & 
insignificant 
IMF 2017 (chap. 3) WS FINGLOB PC, INIT, OPEN, GVC; UD; 
TXC; EPL; PMR 
long-diff (with 
FE);5YA (with FE) 
N=50 countries 
N=129 (sectors) 
T; 1991-2014 
FINGLOB: negative & 
significant for country-level 
estimation 
Stockhammer 2017 WS (Private 
Sector) 
FINGLOB ICT, KL, OPEN, TOT, GC, 
UD, GRW 
FE; FD; 5YA; GMM N = 28  
T: 1980-2000 
FINGLOB: negative & 
significant 
 
Abbreviations of variables: BRR: benefit replacement rate; CAO: capital account openness; CAPCON: capital controls; CC: currency crisis; CI: computer investment;  COL: college education among workers; DEPR: 
depreciation of non-financial companies to total depreciation; DIVPAY: dividend payments; E: employment; EBIT: earnings before interest and taxes; EPL: employment protection legislation; ESI: employment size in 
industry; EXREV: export revenues; FA: fixed assets; FDI: foreign direct investment; FI: financial income to business income; FINGLOB: Financial globalisation; FININC:  financial income; FX: foreign exchange rate;  
GC: government consumption; GRW: GDP growth; GVC: global value chain linkages; IC: industrial concentration; ICT: information and computer technology; INIT: initial exposure to routinization; IMP: import 
penetration; INTPAY: interest payments; INV: investment rate; IR: interest rate; KL: capital-labour ratio; LRIR: long-term real interest rate; OPEN: trade openness; OW: old workers to labour force; PC: Relative price of 
investment (capital deflator/ CPI);  PM: import prices; PMR: product market regulation; PS: profit share; STR: strikes; TOT: terms of trade; TW: tax wedge; TXT: taxes on trade; TXC: corporate tax rate; U: unemployment 
rate; UD: union density; VA: value added; WR: wage rate; WS: wage share; WW: non-Hispanic white workers to labour force; Y: GDP per Worker; YW: young workers to labour force 
Abbreviation of econometric methods and sample properties: 5YA: 5 year averages; ADL: auto-regressive distributed lag model; ECM: error correction model; FD: first difference estimator; FE: within estimator (cross-
section fixed effects); FE2: cross-section and period fixed effects; FGLS: feasible generalised least squares; GLS: generalised least squares; GMM: generalised method of moments; long-diff: long-term annualized changes 
between 10 years or more; IV: instrumental variable estimation using lags as instruments; N: number of cross-sections; OLS: ordinary least squares; T: time period 
 
10 
2.2. Financial payments of non-financial companies (NFC) and mark-up pricing 
The idea that firms set prices based on unit costs plus a mark-up is prevalent in heterodox 
economic thought. In particular contemporary Kaleckians (Hein 2015) have argued that 
financialisation affects the wage share because financial payments by non-financial 
businesses constitute financial overhead costs that may lead to an increase in the mark-up 
entrepreneurs charge on unit costs. Kalecki (1969) assumed that firms operate in oligopolistic 
markets in which they charge a mark-up in accordance with the degree of monopoly. A rise in 
the mark-up will increase prices, reduce real wages and thereby increase the profit share. He 
also mentioned the possibility that the mark-up rises with increasing overhead costs (ibid., pp. 
17-18). Hein (2015) argues that if the mark-up is elastic with respect to interest and dividend 
payments, a rise in these financial overhead costs will decrease the wage share. This argument 
is also consistent with Sraffian theory and other theories of cost-pricing. Notably, it 
presupposes that firms possess the power to raise the mark-up in response to an increase in 
overhead costs. Financialisation can increase financial overhead cost due to shareholder value 
orientation, which pressures firms to maintain rising share prices (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000). In order to achieve this aim, firms may increase the dividend payout ratio or take on 
debt to buy back shares. As a result, interest and dividend payments would increase. This 
channel thus assumes a power struggle between rentiers and industrial capitalists that is 
eventually being resolved at the expense of workers. 
 
This argument has motivated three econometric studies. Hein and Schoder (2011) estimate an 
autoregressive distributed lag model for the USA and Germany between 1963 and 2007 and 
report a weakly significant (at the 10% level) positive impact of net interest payments on the 
profit share. Dünhaupt (2016) regresses the wage share on net dividend and interest payments 
of non-financial corporations using a panel of 13 OECD countries over the period 1986-2007. 
She finds a strong and statistically significant negative impact of dividend payments, whereas 
the coefficient on interest payments is negative but statistically insignificant. Alvarez (2015) 
uses interest payments as an explanatory variable and finds a negative effect on the wage 
share in France.  
 
2.3. Increased competition on capital markets and shareholder value maximisation 
The emergence of a market for corporate control has been discussed in the mainstream and in 
the financialisation literature. For example, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that with 
the rise of shareholder power firm strategies have shifted from ‘retain and reinvest’ to 
11 
‘downsize and distribute’, with a focus on short-term capital gains at the expense of long-term 
investment. This argument has been formalised (Stockhammer 2004; Dallery 2009) in order 
to analyse changes in investment behaviour. The distributional consequences of shareholder 
value maximisation have received less attention and empirical research has so far focussed on 
the impact on investment (Stockhammer 2004; Orhangazi 2008; Demir 2009; Tori and 
Onaran 2017). There is also a mainstream version of the argument (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Jensen 2001) that endorses shareholder value orientation because it would improve 
efficiency.  
 
Some neo-Marxian authors (Martin et al. 2008; Bryan et al. 2009; Sotiropoulos and 
Lapatsioras 2014) suggest that the process of securitisation and increased trading of financial 
assets affects the internal organisation of production. Financialisation has increased the 
pressure on firms as capital markets have become more competitive - with negative effects for 
workers. The process of securitisation and derivative trading of short-term oriented financial 
investors led to an increasing importance of the valuation of firm securities on secondary 
markets. A ‘capitalist firm that goes to the markets to raise funds acquires a risk profile which 
depends to a significant extent on its ability to pursue effective exploitation strategies in a 
competitive economic environment’ (Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras 2014, pp. 94-95). Through 
the pricing of financial assets the economic efficiency of a firm becomes objectively 
quantified and hence commensurable with other monetary prices. This puts firms under 
pressure to guarantee an appreciation of their stocks (Bryan et al., 2009). As the price of 
securities is a function of the internal efficiency of the firm, this process will induce ruthless 
cost-cutting, especially wage suppression, but also intensification of work (Lapavitsas 2009, 
p. 125). This argument is related to Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) but here the change in 
manager behaviour is induced by the forces of competition rather than shareholder value 
orientation. Similar to the mark-up pricing channel, the primary conflict is between rentiers 
and firms, but it is being settled at the expense of workers. 
 
Within a Marxian framework the argument that increased short-termism and competition in 
capital markets leads to an increase in the profit rate and exploitation raises some issues. The 
argument implies that capitalists did not exploit workers to the extent that they could have 
prior to securitisation. This presupposes that industrial capitalists were not profit maximising, 
i.e. did not make full use of their bargaining power. While the corporate governance literature 
is explicit about this and argues that the shareholder value revolution has unsettled a balance 
12 
between stakeholders and shareholders that had been more favourable to workers,
8
 it is 
difficult to find similar statements in the neo-Marxian literature. Importantly, there are as of 
yet no econometric studies to substantiate the effects of increased competition on capital 
markets. 
 
2.4 Rising household debt 
In the wake of the financial crisis rising household debt has gained prominence. Several 
authors (Barba and Pivetti 2009; Frank et al. 2014; Stockhammer 2015; Cynamon and Fazzari 
2016) have claimed that distributional changes and household debt are related, but that 
causality goes from distribution to debt. Barba and Pivetti (2009) and Stockhammer (2015) 
argue that as wages fell workers tried to maintain consumption levels through debt financing. 
Frank et al. (2014) as well as Barba and Pivetti (2009) argue that as personal income 
inequality increased, poor households tried to keep up with richer households and thus ran 
into debt.  
 
There is only little systematic work on the effects of working class indebtedness on the wage 
share. Panico et al. (2012) present a two-class model with a banking sector to analyse the 
distributional consequences of increasing debt-financed workers’ consumption due to easier 
access to credit. In the model, the profit share increases when the rate of growth of loans to 
workers exceeds the rate of growth of total wages. The authors conclude that ‘an expansion of 
the banking industry [to lend to workers] affects the income shares, even if the rate of profit 
and wages remain constant’ (Panico et al. 2012, p. 1467). However, this statement is 
misleading. The crucial assumption in the argument is not lending per se, but the increase of 
autonomous working-class consumption. An increase in borrowing that does not affect 
consumption (e.g. buying a house) would not affect distribution.
9
 It is not the level of 
household debt that matters, but the exogenous increase in consumption relative to income. 
Changes in debt are the outcome, not the cause of the process. Thus the model does not 
provide a sufficient foundation for analysing how household debt affects functional income 
distribution. 
 
                                                 
8
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) explicitly argue from a principal-agent point of view that firms were inefficient. 
9
 Most credit to households is mortgage credit and related to asset transactions (e.g. Figure 2 in Cynamon and 
Fazzari, 2016, for the USA). 
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Bryan et al. (2009, p. 470) and Barba and Pivetti (2009, p. 127) offer various hints that 
working-class indebtedness may affect working class power, but no thorough analysis.
10
 The 
Cultural Political Economy literature argues that financialisation has not so much changed the 
relations between existing social actors, but that it constructs ‘investor identities’, i.e. it 
transforms agents’ perceptions of their identities and their interests (e.g. Langley 2007). 
Without referring to this theoretical approach, Fligstein and Goldstein (2015) find in an 
empirical study of about 4000 US-households between 1989 and 2007 that it was above all 
the middle and upper middle class that has embraced a new 'finance culture' expressed by a 
higher willingness to take on risk through financial investment and to borrow money to 
sustain a high level of consumption. It could be argued that a working but individualised 
middle class that focuses on financial income streams, portfolio management, and debt-
financed consumption is less likely to engage in collective action to fight for higher wages. 
 
There is also an empirical literature on financial vulnerability, which refers to the financial 
incapacity of households to cover monthly expenses of basic consumption, the inability to 
meet unexpected payment obligations, and accumulation of arrears (Anderloni et al., 2012). 
The authors develop an index of financial vulnerability using a sample of 4000 Italian 
households in 2009 and find statistically significant positive effects of the level of debt 
servicing on financial vulnerability. The study does not link the finding to class relations, but 
the impact of financial vulnerability on class struggles is immediate if we assume that class 
consciousness contributes to working class militancy. Working class households and 
university graduates might be worried about their access to credit and about the repercussions 
of personal bankruptcy, and therefore eager to service their debt. This can make them 
reluctant to join industrial action that might cost them their job. Kim et al. (2017) integrate 
this channel into a Kaleckian macro model in which higher indebtedness reduces worker’s 
bargaining power as it increases the cost of job loss. They argue that the resulting increase in 
inequality may induce workers to take on even more debt, which can give rise to a vicious 
cycle of household debt and inequality. The argument is consistent, but incomplete as workers 
typically hold assets (for example a house) as well. In this channel, the power relation is thus 
between banks and households, but may spill over to industrial conflicts. 
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 Bryan et al. (2009, p. 470) argue that the rise in household debt increased the ‘likelihood of each household 
offering more workers to the market and each worker’s commitment to deliver productivity growth and longer 
working weeks as the condition of meeting her own costs of subsistence’. However, no further explanation is 
offered why households would do that rather than, say, default on their debt, or demand higher wages. Similarly, 
Barba and Pivetti (2009, p. 127) state that ‘the burden of servicing their debt pushes [workers] […] to work 
harder and for longer hours […] thereby contributing to the persistence of low wages and labour costs'.  
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Wood (2017) and Guschanski and Onaran (2016) are the only studies that investigate the 
effect of household debt on the wage share. Wood (2017) finds a negative effect of mortgage 
debt in Great Britain and the USA, but no effect in Sweden and Denmark for the period 1979-
2012. Guschanski and Onaran (2016) find a negative effect of household debt (measured at 
the country level) on sectoral wage shares in Austria, Great Britain, and the USA between 
1970-2010. However, they do not find evidence in estimations with a pool of all countries, 
suggesting that the effect is country dependent.  
 
2.5 Other determinants of the wage share: labour market institutions, globalisation and 
technology 
The wage share will also be influenced by factors other than financialisation. In line with the 
Political Economy approach to income distribution, Kristal (2010) distinguishes three fields 
of workers’ bargaining power: organisational power in the economic sphere, which she 
operationalises by union density and strike activity; organisational power in the political 
sphere, which is measured by the political orientation of government and social spending; and 
structural power in the global sphere approximated by the import shares, migration and FDI. 
Positive effects of union density on the wage share were found by Kristal (2010), ILO (2011), 
Stockhammer (2009; 2017) and Guschanski and Onaran (2017). Other labour market 
institutions that affect the exit options of workers are employment protection legislation, 
minimum wages, unemployment benefits, and bargaining coverage. However, these variables 
have produced mixed results in previous studies.
11
 
 
Many studies link a strengthening of firms’ bargaining power to globalisation via foreign 
direct investment and offshoring. For example Choi (2001) uses a Nash bargaining model to 
analyse the bargaining relationship between unionised workers and a multinational firm that 
has the option of outsourcing production via foreign direct investment (FDI) and finds a 
negative relation between FDI and wages. In an empirical study with over a hundred countries 
over the 1960 to 1997 period, Harrison (2002) fails to find robust effects of outward FDI on 
the wage share, although there is evidence for a negative effect of inward FDI. Guschanski 
                                                 
11
 EC (2007) finds a positive effect of minimum wages on the wage share, but an unexpected negative effect of 
unemployment benefits and employment protection legislation. Likewise, the IMF (2007) reports a negative 
effect of unemployment benefits. Stockhammer (2017), on the other hand, does not find statistically significant 
effects of these variables.  
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and Onaran (2017) find a negative effect of offshoring to Global South countries on the sector 
level wage share in 14 OECD countries over the period 1995-2007. 
 
IMF (2017, chap. 3) suggest that de facto financial globalisation can reduce the relative price 
of capital, which would increase the wage share if the elasticity of substitution is smaller than 
one. However, their finding of a negative impact of financial globalisation for advanced 
economies suggests that either the elasticity of substitution is above one or that the negative 
effect is due to the bargaining channel discussed above. 
 
Mainstream economists have put forward an explanation of the declining wage share that 
refers to skill-biased technical change in the context of globalisation without taking 
financialisation into account. In a neoclassical framework, factor incomes are determined by 
their marginal productivity. Skill-biased technical change has caused substitution of low-
skilled workers by machines, especially for routine tasks that are easily automatized. The 
effect of this process on the wage share depends on the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour. If the elasticity is above one, as is usually assumed for low-skilled 
workers, the effect will be negative. Conversely, the effect can be positive for high-skilled 
workers. If the latter effect outweighs the former, the aggregate wage share declines. 
Globalisation accelerates this process through international specialisation, which is especially 
harmful for low-skilled workers in developed countries, while it simultaneously increases the 
global labour supply and facilitates offshoring. These hypotheses are empirically investigated 
by the EC (2007, chap. 5), IMF (2007, chap. 4), and Bassanini and Manfredi (2012) by means 
of panel analysis but neither of these studies controls for financialisation variables. 
 
2.6 Summary    
We have identified four distinct mechanisms by which financialisation can affect the wage 
share and tried to clarify their theoretical foundations. First, bargaining models argue that 
financialisation has increased the exit options for corporations and thereby enhanced their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis workers. Second, contemporary Kaleckians maintain that financial 
payments such as interest and dividend payments constitute overhead costs for firms, which 
will increase their mark-up. Third, competitive pressures on firms due to securitisation and 
financial trading can lead to wage suppression and intensification of work. This has been 
highlighted by Marxian writers on financialisation and by the critical stream of the 
shareholder value literature. Fourth, increasing financialisation of households, in particular 
16 
the rise of household debt, may have increased the financial vulnerability of working-class 
households and undermined working-class consciousness by establishing a self-perception of 
households as financial managers. This may have weakened labour vis-à-vis capital. All of 
these channels are grounded in heterodox Political Economy; neoclassical economics is 
notably absent from these debates as it has highlighted skill-biased technical change and 
globalisation, and has so far not included financialisation. An exception is IMF (2017, chap. 
3) which has suggested that financial globalisation can reduce the wage share via a reduction 
in the relative price of capital, if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one. However, this 
channel is not related to a change in bargaining power. 
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the mechanisms by which financialisation affects income 
distribution (column 1), their theoretical foundation (column 2), and power relations that are 
being highlighted (column 3). It also matches the existing econometric panel studies (column 
4) and their empirical measures (column 5), and lastly indicates the empirical measures that 
we will be using (column 6). There is a notable asymmetry in the empirical attention that the 
different mechanisms have received. Bargaining power models and the exit option of capital, 
as well as the hypothesis of financial overheads and flexible mark-ups have motivated a few 
studies. So far there are two studies investigating the effect of household debt on the wage 
share, while the competitive pressures on capital markets has not given rise to econometric 
investigations.  
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Channel Theoretical 
origin 
Main 
power 
relation 
between: 
Theoretical and 
empirical 
studies 
Empirical 
measures used 
Proposed 
measures 
Enhanced exit 
options for NFCs 
Models of 
bargaining  
Firms and 
workers 
Harrison (2002); 
Jayadev (2007); 
Stockhammer 
(2009, 2017);  
ILO (2011); Lin 
and 
Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013); 
Alvarez (2015); 
IMF (2017, 
chap. 3) 
Financial 
openness (de 
jure) 
 
Financial 
globalisation (de 
facto)  
 
Financial profits 
of NFCs to 
business profits 
Financial 
openness (de 
jure) 
 
Financial 
globalisation 
(de facto) 
 
Financial 
income of NFCs 
Increasing 
financial 
overhead costs 
for NFCs and 
elastic mark-ups 
Cost-plus 
pricing theories 
Rentiers 
and firms 
Hein and 
Schoder (2011); 
Hein (2015); 
Alvarez (2015); 
Dünhaupt (2016) 
 
Net interest 
payments of 
NFCs  
Net dividend 
payments of 
NFCs 
Net financial 
payments of 
NFCs  
Increased 
competition on 
capital markets 
puts pressure on 
NFCs  
Shareholder 
value literature 
Rentiers 
and firms; 
firms and 
workers 
Martin et al. 
2008; Bryan et 
al. 2009; 
Sotiropoulos and 
Lapatsioras 2014 
 Stock market 
turnover  
 
Household debt 
and financial 
vulnerability of 
workers 
Cultural 
Political 
Economy and 
heterodox 
macroeconomics 
Banks and 
workers; 
workers 
and firms 
Panico et al. 
(2012); Kim et 
al. (2017); 
Guschanski and 
Onaran (2016); 
Wood (2017) 
Mortgage debt 
Household debt 
Household debt 
 
Table 2: Channels linking financialisation and the wage share 
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Our objective is to assess the relevance of different channels, but these are likely to be 
interrelated.
12
 For example, financial openness can increase competition on capital markets. 
Different measures of financialisation might constitute intervening variables with respect to 
each other, thus we control for all channels simultaneously, as estimations with individual 
variables might conceal the precise channel at work. 
 
3. Variables and econometric method 
3.1 Regression equation and variable definitions 
In order to test the four hypotheses regarding the effect of financialisation on the wage share, 
the following equation is estimated: 
 
(1) 𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝐼𝑇+𝑏2𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑌 + 𝑏3𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 + 𝑏4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝐷 + 𝑏5𝑈𝑖,𝑡 
+𝑏6𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏7𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏8𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏9𝐺𝑅𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where subscript i stands for cross-sections, t represents the time period, ai denotes a country 
specific constant and εi,t  is the error term. The dependent variable, WS, is the adjusted wage 
share. It is defined as the average compensation of employees times total employment 
(including self-employment) divided by GDP at factor costs, i.e. after indirect taxes.
13
 
Thereby, the wage share is being adjusted for the compensation of self-employed workers 
whose income is imputed based on the average wage of employees. The wage share is 
regressed on four financialisation variables that capture the exit options of capital (FIN
EXIT
), 
the financial payments of non-financial businesses (FIN
NFCPAY
), the competition in capital 
markets (FIN
CAPCOMP
), and household debt (FIN
HHD
). We further use a set of control variables 
to account for other factors that affect the wage share. 
 
As labour market indicators we use union density (UD) and the unemployment rate (U). UD 
is calculated as the ratio of wage and salary earners who are members of a trade union to the 
total number of wage and salary earners. It captures the effects of a reduction in workers’ 
bargaining power which are not explained by financialisation. U is defined as unemployed 
persons as a share of the total labour force.
14
 We use trade openness (OPEN), exports plus 
                                                 
12
 Table A5 in the appendix provides correlation coefficients between different measures of financialisation. 
13
 Table A1 provides data definitions and sources. 
14
 We also considered other LMIs such as collective bargaining coverage and the gross replacement ratio. They 
were insignificant in our estimations and were consequently excluded from the analysis. The results can be found 
in Table A3 in the appendix. 
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imports over GDP, as a measure of globalisation and thus (non-financial) exit options for 
capital, e.g. in the form of offshoring. To measure the effect of skill-biased technical change 
we employ the share of value added of the information and computer services sector in GDP 
(ICT). The expected sign of its coefficient is negative because it is assumed by mainstream 
authors that this kind of technical change reduces the income of unskilled workers, which 
make up a large share of the work force. GRWTH is the growth rate of real and serves as a 
business cycle measure. It is supposed to control for the countercyclicality of the wage share 
due to overhead costs and rigid wage incomes (Kalecki 1969, chap. 2).  
 
We use four distinct measures for financialisation to capture the different mechanisms 
involved. Where more than one variable is available to proxy a mechanism we estimate our 
baseline specification including each measures subsequently and then keep the one with the 
highest z-statistic. We aim for one variable per mechanism for symmetry and in order to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. For the exit option of capital highlighted by the bargaining power 
framework we consider financial globalisation (FINGLOB), financial openness (FINOP), and 
financial income of NFCs (FININC). We expect a negative effect on the wage share as these 
variables measure the exit options of capital. FINGLOB is defined as the logarithm of foreign 
assets plus foreign liabilities divided by GDP. This is an ex post economic measure. It has 
been used in Stockhammer (2009, 2017) and ILO (2011). FINOP is a de jure index for 
financial openness accounting for the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on 
current account transactions and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds 
developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). It is similar to the index used by Jayadev (2007). FININC 
is the sum of dividend and interest income of NFCs as a ratio to the value added of this sector 
and is thus close to the variable used by Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013). Among these 
variables FINOP performed better than FINGLOB and FININC and thus is included in our 
baseline specification. Figure 2.1 shows the average of FINOP for our sample of 14 OECD 
countries from 1980 to 2014. It demonstrates that financial liberalisation has largely taken 
place between 1980 and 2002, while the highest degree of financial openness has been 
reached in 2003.  
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Figure 2: Financialisation variables, 1980-2014 
Note: Solid lines are unweighted averages over 14 OECD countries. Dotted lines are unweighted averages plus/minus one standard deviation. The strong increase in the cross-
country variance of FINPAY in 1990 is due to an increase in the sample size in that year. 
Figure 2.1: Financial openness index, 1980-2014 
 
Data source: Chinn and Ito (2006) 
Figure 2.2: Net financial payments of NFCs, 1980-2014
 
Data source: OECD 
Figure 2.3: Stock market turnover ratio, 1980-2014 
 
Data source: World Bank 
Figure 2.4: Household debt to disposable income, 1980-2014 
 
Data source: BIS 
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For the financial payments of non-financial firms we construct the measure FINPAY, which is 
the sum of net dividend payments and net interest payments of NFCs as a ratio to the value 
added of this sector. We sum interest and dividend payments as both factors should have the 
same effect according to the hypothesis of a financial cost elastic mark-up. Following the 
existing literature, we use net financial payments (Hein and Schoder 2011; Dünhaupt 2016). 
The expected sign is negative because of the assumption that financial overhead costs are 
shifted onto the mark-up. Figure 2.2 shows the average FINPAY for our sample. The variable 
exhibits some volatility, with an increase between 1980 and 1992, and a declining trend 
between 1992 and 2014 which is largely due to falling interest payments in this subperiod. 
FINPAY peaked in 1992 at 16.3% of value added and decreased to 10.2% by 2014. However, 
the declining trend in the second half was interrupted by an intermediate phase of rising 
financial payments between the early 2002 and the financial crisis (2008). 
 
The competition on capital markets has been highlighted by neo-Marxian authors and the 
corporate governance literature, but they have not operationalised this channel empirically. 
We measure it by the stock market turnover ratio (STO), which is defined as the total value of 
shares traded per year divided by the average market capitalisation. The variable is expected 
to have a negative impact on the wage share, since it expresses the competitive pressure of 
short-term oriented financial investors on firms to raise labour productivity and supress 
wages. STO is only an indirect measure of this mechanism since it does not directly measure 
changes in the internal structure or behaviour of firms. Moreover, a variable measuring the 
velocity of bond trading would have been desirable to complement STO but is unfortunately 
not available. As depicted in Figure 2.3 the variable has a rising trend that started in 1982 at 
16.4% and subsequently increasing to 128.1% in 2007. STO then sharply declined due to the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and only weakly recovered in 2014 to a value of 94.2%. 
 
In order to account for a potentially negative impact of workers’ debt on their bargaining 
power, we use household debt as percentage of the disposable income of households (HHD) 
as a proxy for workers’ debt. The expected effect on the wage share is negative. Figure 2.4 
shows HHD for our sample. A clear rising trend is visible starting from 46.2% in 1980 and 
peaking at 126.8% in 2010. In the last two years of our sample, HHD declined by a two 
percentage points. 
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3.2 Econometric method 
The data set we use is an unbalanced panel consisting of 14 OECD countries
15
 over the period 
1990-2014 with all financialisation variables, and from 1980 to 2014 in specifications with 
only one financialisation variable each. Moreover, we include a dummy variable that assumes 
the value 1 in the period after the financial crisis in 2007 (D-0814) as it improves the 
explanatory power of the model.
16
 
 
The panel approach is used due to the large number of variables and relatively short time 
series. Our panel has a small N and somewhat larger T (N=14, T=25). This is typical for 
macroeconomic panels and implies that we have to be more concerned about autocorrelation 
than microeconometric contributions that have a large N and small T. Our first tentative 
specification is a within-estimator in levels. Unit root tests, however, indicate that WS, U, and 
UD are integrated of order one (I(1)).
17
 The level-specification is thus prone to spurious 
correlation problems. We therefore choose a first-difference estimator as our baseline 
specification. First differencing renders I(1) variables stationary and removes country-specific 
constants that can bias the coefficients and cause serial correlation in the residuals. Moreover, 
we first estimate a general specification with a lagged dependent variable
18
 and a 
contemporaneous and lagged explanatory variable each. This allows us to capture lagged 
effects and reduces autocorrelation in the residuals, but we lose the first two periods. We then 
successively exclude either the contemporaneous or lagged variables with the lowest absolute 
z-statistic. The resulting specification constitutes our baseline specification. 
 
We subject our baseline specification to several robustness checks. First, we estimate models 
with only one financialisation variable each. Notably this extends our maximum sample 
period from 1990-2014 to 1980-2014.
19
 Second, we conduct robustness tests by adding 
                                                 
15
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USA. Due to data restrictions inclusion of non-OECD countries was not 
possible. The choice of countries is mainly due to data availability. Central and Eastern European countries were 
excluded to avoid distorting effects of the historically unique transformation from centrally planned to capitalist 
market economies. Our dataset starts with the onset of financialisation in 1980. We restrict our baseline sample 
to the period after 1989 to have at least five countries per period in the estimations.  
16
 Our results are robust to the exclusion of this variable. 
17
 Reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
18
 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a first difference estimator leads to correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term which violates the exogeneity assumption. In order to deal with this 
problem, we apply an instrumental variable estimator using the first difference of the second lag of the 
dependent variables as an instrument for the first lag of the dependent variable.  
19
 The drawback is that our panel becomes more unbalanced as we have less than five countries in the earliest 
years of the sample. 
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various additional explanatory variables to our baseline model: MIGR, VAFIN, and PPI. 
Third, the baseline specification is estimated using an error-correction model (ECM), as well 
as 5-year non-overlapping averages, which are techniques for capturing long-run relationships 
as opposed to short-run effects. 
 
4. Econometric results 
The results of our main estimations are summarised in Table 3. Our baseline specification (1) 
is a first-difference estimator with a lag structure that has been obtained from a testing-down 
procedure. This accounts for problems of non-stationarity and serial correlation, which is 
confirmed by a test on the residuals that rejects the null hypothesis of autocorrelation of the 
first order. With respect to the financialisation variables, we find that FINOP and FINPAY are 
statistically significant at the 5% level and exhibit the expected negative effect. This 
corroborates the results of earlier studies with data prior to the Great Recession, which found 
statistically significant effects of de facto measures of financial globalisation (Jayadev 2007; 
ILO 2011; Stockhammer 2017), and financial payments of businesses (Hein and Schoder 
2011; Dünhaupt 2016) who have tested these in specifications without other financialisation 
variables. We confirm these effects in a joint specification with several financialisation 
measures. We fail, however, to find evidence for a statistically significant effect of STO and 
HHD. While testing the effect of STO on the wage share is a novelty of this paper, our result 
for HHD is somewhat at odds with the studies of Wood (2017) and Guschanski and Onaran 
(2016) who found negative effects of HHD in single country estimations. However, both 
studies fail to find a negative effect when they pool the countries of their sample. This 
suggests that the effect of HHD on the wage share only prevails in some countries.  
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Table 3: Main estimation results  
Specification 
number 
(1) 
(baseline) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation 
method 
First 
difference 
First 
difference 
First 
difference 
First 
difference 
First 
difference 
First 
difference 
FINOP(-1) -2.700** 
(0.046) 
-1.977* 
(0.072) 
   -3.108** 
   (0.031) 
FINPAY(-1) -5.609**  -4.242*   -4.912* 
(0.042)  (0.091)   (0.074) 
STO(-1) -0.120   -0.260*  -0.135 
(0.468)   (0.070)  (0.428) 
HHD(-1) -0.052    -0.381 0.231 
 (0.956)    (0.668) (0.806) 
U(-1) -13.904** -14.837** -15.123** -15.935*** -14.619** -17.161*** 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.018) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) 
UD(-1) -11.647 -4.534 -6.201 -4.170 -6.755 -7.114 
 (0.154) (0.488) (0.453) (0.518) (0.429) (0.378) 
OPEN -6.721*** -6.207*** -5.882*** -6.412*** -5.567*** -6.820*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICT -67.176** -60.249** -76.186** -59.050** -74.256** -72.535** 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.013) (0.046) (0.015) (0.019) 
ICT(-1) 69.998** 52.818* 63.681** 50.117* 69.549** 62.660** 
 (0.013) (0.071) (0.022) (0.089) (0.013) (0.027) 
GRWTH -15.988*** -18.552*** -18.527*** -18.697*** -18.442*** -16.343*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D-0814 0.369** 0.228 0.254 0.286* 0.228 0.330* 
 (0.030) (0.168) (0.134) (0.084) (0.187) (0.060) 
MIGR      -8.580 
      (0.144) 
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Observations 265 352 289 347 290 252 
F-test 17.082*** 23.139*** 21.963*** 23.288*** 19.218*** 15.592*** 
Adj.R
2
 0.430 0.398 0.408 0.399 0.403 0.449 
Period 1992-2014 1982-2014 1982-2014 1982-2014 1982-2014 1992-2013 
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share. P-values are in parenthesis below the estimation 
coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All standard errors were 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Note that the estimation period is two years shorter than the 
sample period due to the inclusion of differenced lagged explanatory variables. 
 
With respect to the control variables we note statistically significant effects of U, OPEN, ICT, 
and GRWTH. The negative effects of U and OPEN constitute empirical support for the 
argument that the exit options of workers and firms are affected by the state of the labour 
market and the possibility of firms to offshore production (Kristal 2010). ICT enters our 
specification both as a contemporaneous effect and as a first lag. Both are statistically 
significant, but the contemporaneous effect is negative and the lagged effect is positive, while 
the size of the coefficients is of similar absolute magnitude. One may conclude that there is a 
negative effect as predicted by neoclassical theory (EC 2007, chap. 5; IMF 2007, chap. 4) but 
25 
that the long-term effect is close to zero.
20
 GRWTH is statistically significant with the 
expected negative sign due to the countercyclical behaviour of the wage share.  
 
Specifications (2)-(5) are robustness tests on the baseline model in which we include each 
financialisation variable separately. This exercise confirms the statistical significance of 
FINOP and FINPAY also for a substantially longer sample period (34 and 33 years, 
respectively). Moreover, we now find a statistically significant effect of STO (at the 10% 
level). For HHD, we again fail to reject the null hypothesis. In specification (6) we add a 
measure of labour migration (MIGR) defined as the change in the share of foreigners in the 
total labour force.  Insofar as migrant workers are willing to work for lower wages than 
domestic workers, one would expect a negative effect. Indeed, this is often the underlying 
assumption behind political anti-immigration campaigns that have gained strong prominence 
recently. We observe that the effect of FINOP and FINPAY is robust to the inclusion of MIGR 
to the baseline model. MIGR turns out to be statistically insignificant, indicating that the 
mobility of capital, as captured by FINOP, rather than labour contributed to the decline in the 
wage share.  
 
A further set of robustness tests is reported in Table 4. Specification (7) applies a simple 
within-estimator in levels with only contemporaneous effects. We note a statistically 
significant negative effect of FINPAY at the 5% level. The other financialisation variables are 
statistically insignificant. However, a unit-root test on the residuals suggests that these 
findings are not reliable (see Table A2 in the appendix). In specification (8), we replace HHD 
by PPI, a measure of property price inflation, which can be interpreted as an alternative 
measure for the financialisation of households. Given that several authors have argued that 
inequality leads to an increase in household debt (Barba and Pivetti 2009; Frank 2014), the 
coefficient for HHD may suffer from an endogeneity bias. PPI is constructed as the first 
difference of a real house price index. It is expected to pick up the dynamics of mortgage debt 
that is due to rising asset prices that serve as collateral. The variable is statistically 
insignificant, while leaving the other results unaffected. This supports our finding that HHD 
does not have a statistically significant effect and suggests that a possible endogeneity bias is 
negligible. Specification (9) adds the value added of the financial sector relative to total value 
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 The zero-long-term effect was also confirmed by a Wald test. The presence of opposite signs on the 
contemporaneous and lagged effect may suggest using the second difference of ICT. We estimated such a 
specification, which did not change our results significantly.  
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added (VAFIN) as a measure of the change in the sectoral composition of the economy 
towards finance. Hein (2015) points out that financialisation can depress wage shares simply 
because of sectoral change given that wage shares in the financial sector are typically below 
average. FINOP and FINPAY remain robust, while VAFIN is statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that the decline in the wage share is not merely driven by a change in the sectoral 
composition of the economy due to the relative growth of the financial sector.  
 
Given that financialisation is conceived as a structural change of the economy, some of its 
effect on the wage share may materialise only over longer periods. The last two specifications 
aim to assess these long-run effects of our explanatory variables. Specification (10) 
constitutes an ECM. ECMs are used to disentangle short- and long-run effects that stem from 
cointegration relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables. We find a 
statistically significant negative long-run effect of FINPAY and of our control variables U and 
OPEN. The last specification (11) is based on 5-year non-overlapping averages to smoothen 
out short-run fluctuations. Here we confirm the effect of FINPAY again. Moreover, STO 
becomes statistically significant at the 5% level with the expected sign. Among the control 
variables, we observe statistically significant effects of U and OPEN. We thus find robust 
evidence for a long-term effect of FINPAY, as well as U and OPEN on the wage share. This 
suggests that financial overhead costs have a long-lasting effect on mark-ups. FINOP, in 
contrast, only exhibits short-run effects. One may conclude that the firing threat due to 
enhanced exit options of firms loses its credibility in the medium-run. This could be the case 
if the threat to relocate has a stronger distributional impact than the relocation itself. However, 
due to the relatively short time period of our sample, we consider the coefficients of our short-
run baseline specification (1) more reliable. 
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Table 4: Robustness tests 
Specification number (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Estimation  
method 
Within First difference First difference ECM 5-year  
averages 
FINOP 0.186    0.815 
 (0.946)    (0.795) 
FINOP(-1)  -2.847** -2.667** 0.647  
  (0.034) (0.048) (0.897)  
FINPAY -16.329**    -28.444*** 
 (0.035)    (0.006) 
FINPAY(-1)  -4.430* -5.799** -27.641**  
  (0.096) (0.040) (0.020)  
STO -0.631    -1.704** 
 (0.166)    (0.025) 
STO(-1)  -0.185 -0.169 0.126  
  (0.276) (0.336) (0.900)  
HHD 1.482    2.135 
 (0.396)    (0.289) 
HHD(-1)   -0.103 1.056  
   (0.923) (0.493)  
U -24.186***    -22.707** 
 (0.002)    (0.035) 
U(-1)  -14.943*** -11.750 -61.779***  
  (0.009) (0.142) (0.000)  
UD -1.002    2.328 
 (0.926)    (0.858) 
UD(-1)  -12.364 -12.433 -31.193**  
  (0.132) (0.142) (0.024)  
OPEN -9.123** -6.167*** -6.114***  -11.615** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.046) 
OPEN(-1)    -8.279*  
    (0.081)  
ICT -92.493 -74.018** -75.952**  -19.719 
 (0.354) (0.017) (0.021)  (0.864) 
ICT(-1)  63.175** 66.317** -168.308*  
  (0.026) (0.019) (0.068)  
GRWTH -24.899*** -17.547*** -18.181***  -3.463 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.856) 
PPI  0.018    
  (0.408)    
VAFIN   -6.455   
   (0.672)   
D-0814 0.429 0.430** 0.314*  1.432 
 (0.405) (0.012) (0.089)  (0.200) 
constant 77.542***   19.168*** 75.163*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 
Observations 269 258 241 260 68 
F-test/Wald test 15.281*** 16.877*** 13.350*** 152.39*** 5.828*** 
Adj. R
2
 0.282 0.439 0.420 0.484 0.070 
Period 1992-2013 1992-2014 1992-2014 1992-2013 1994-2013 
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share. P-values are in parenthesis below the estimation 
coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All standard errors were 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. Only the long-run coefficients of the ECM are reported (for the short-run 
coefficients, see Table A6 in the appendix). 
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Finally, we investigate the economic significance of our variables by calculating standardised 
coefficients. These coefficients allow us to compare the relative effect size of the different 
explanatory variables as they transform variables into the same unit.
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 Equation (2) represents 
our baseline first-difference specification with standardised coefficients. Among the 
financialisation variables, FINOP has the strongest effect. An increase in the rate of change of 
FINOP by one standard deviation reduces the rate of change of the wage share by about 0.11 
percentage points. FINPAY exhibits the next largest effect with an increase in the rate of 
change by one standard deviation reducing the rate of change of the wage share by about 0.1 
percentage points. The economic effects of STO and HHD are comparably low, which 
corresponds to the finding that these variables are statistically insignificant. Among the 
control variables we note a comparably strong effect of GRWTH, which stems from the 
countercyclical behaviour of wages and salaries. Economically more interesting is the 
relatively large effect (0.28) of OPEN, which points to the relevance of trade globalisation for 
the decline of the wage share. U also has a sizeable effect (0.16) which confirms the 
hypothesis that a high unemployment rate worsens the exit options of workers. For ICT, we 
use the sum of the contemporaneous effect and the first lag which exhibit opposite signs in 
specification (2). The effect is very small compared to the other variables which confirms our 
presumption that its long-run effect is close to zero. Taking all financialisation variables 
together, we obtain a negative effect of -0.25, which is in the same order of magnitude as 
OPEN, and larger than the effect of U. 
 
(2) ∆𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑡 = − 0.114∆𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.099∆𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.035∆𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 
− 0.002∆𝐻𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.155∆𝑈𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.092∆𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.276∆𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 
+ 0.004∆𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 − 0.354∆𝐺𝑅𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡  
 
Our main result is that financialisation indeed has contributed to the decline in the wage share 
through different channels. We find support for the effects of FINOP and FINPAY. Among 
the financialisation variables, FINOP displays the strongest economic effect. Moreover, there 
is evidence that the effect of FINPAY also prevails over longer time periods, and its economic 
effect is comparatively large. STO is statistically significant in some specifications but less 
robust. Its economic effect is relatively low. We fail to find evidence for effects of HHD. For 
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 Standardised coefficients are obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficients by the standard deviations of 
the respective explanatory variables and dividing by the standard deviation of the wage share. They imply that 
all transformed variables have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. They indicate by how many 
standard deviations the wage share changes for a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable.  
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the control variables, we find statistically significant effects of U and OPEN, whereas ICT 
does not display robust effects.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The era of financialisation has been accompanied by a substantial decline in the wage share. 
This paper analyses the link between financialisation and functional income distribution. It 
provides a theoretical clarification by identifying several channels linked to different 
approaches within heterodox Political Economy. We argue that financialisation is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon whose different aspects may impact the wage share through distinct 
channels. Each channel comprises power relations between different classes: Financial 
openness impacts on the exit options of firms and mainly affects the balance of power 
between firms and workers; financial overhead cost and competition on capital markets in the 
first instance intensify the conflict between rentiers and firms, but may be resolved at the 
expense of workers. Lastly, household debt can affect working class identity and undermine 
workers’ position in industrial conflict. The paper presents an empirical analysis in which 
these channels are operationalized and jointly tested by a panel regression analysis for 14 
OECD countries over the period 1992-2014. We find strong effects of financialisation on 
functional income distribution which are, taken together, in the same order of magnitude as 
the effects of globalisation. International financial openness and financial payments of firms 
have the most robust negative impact on the wage share. Financial openness displays the 
largest economic effect, followed by financial payments of businesses. There is only weak 
evidence for the effect of competition on capital markets.  
 
The main advantage of our approach in comparison to previous contributions is that we 
operationalise different channels and jointly assess the relative importance of different 
theoretical approaches, which helps identify potential policy interventions. This is not 
possible in estimations with only one measure of financialisation, as several of the channels 
are interlinked. Our results lend empirical support to theories of bargaining according to 
which the exit options of capital are enhanced by financial openness (Jayadev 2007; 
Stockhammer 2017), as well as to mark-up pricing theories in which the mark-up is elastic 
with respect to financial overhead costs (Hein 2015; Dünhaupt 2016). The shareholder value 
and neo-Marxian literature has linked increased competition on capital markets to downward 
pressure on wages (Martin et al. 2008; Bryan et al. 2009; Sotiropoulos and Lapatsioras 2014). 
We are the first to test this channel empirically, but find only weak support. A possible 
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negative effect of household debt on the wage share has been predicted in the models by 
Panico et al. (2012) and Kim et al. (2017). We have provided further theoretical justification 
for this channel by linking it to class consciousness and worker militancy. However, we do 
not find empirical evidence for this effect in our panel. 
 
Our findings have several important policy implications. They ndicate that the opening of 
domestic financial markets for foreign capital contributed to an erosion of the wage share. 
This is particularly interesting in conjunction with our finding of a negative effect of trade 
openness, and no significant effect of migration. Simply put, wages have stagnated because of 
an increase in capital mobility, not because of labour mobility. If that is correct, how should 
we de-financialise? First, reduce capital mobility. Besides progressive distributional effects, 
there are also benefits for financial stability. International capital flows are pro-cyclical and 
when they come in waves, they often end in financial crises (Reinhart and Reinhart 2009). 
Forbes et al. (2015) show that capital inflow controls can enhance financial stability by 
curbing private credit growth. Second, appropriately designed taxation and corporate 
regulation can decrease financial payments. This would not only encourage firms to invest in 
productive capacity rather than maximising shareholder value (Tori and Onaran 2017), but 
also improve income distribution. This could be achieved through higher taxation of dividend 
payments and capital gains, and by prohibiting share buybacks. Decoupling executives’ 
remuneration from share prices and including representatives of employees and the wider 
public on company boards would support this process (Lazonick 2014). Lastly, Arcand et al. 
(2015) find that the link between finance and growth becomes negative when credit to the 
private sector reaches 80-100% of GDP. De-financialisation is thus a more effective measure 
for improving income distribution than the presently popular migration controls and can be 
macroeconomically beneficial in terms of stability and growth.  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Data definition and data sources 
Variable Abbreviation Definition Source Note 
Adjusted wage 
share 
WS Wage bill divided by 
GDP at factor cost. 
The wage bill includes 
the imputed income of 
self-employed 
workers. 
AMECO  
Financial 
openness 
FINOP Index accounting for 
the presence of 
multiple exchange 
rates, restrictions on 
current account 
transactions and the 
requirement of the 
surrender of export 
proceeds 
Chinn und Ito 
(2006) 
 
Financial 
globalisation 
FINGLOB Logarithm of foreign 
assets plus foreign 
liabilities divided by 
GDP 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) 
Own calculation 
Net financial 
payments of non-
financial 
corporations 
 
 
Net financial 
income of non-
financial 
corporations 
FINPAY 
 
 
 
 
 
FININC 
The sum of net 
dividend payments and 
net interest payments 
of NFCs as a ratio to 
the value added of this 
sector 
 
The sum of dividend 
and interest income of 
NFCs as a ratio to the 
value added of this 
sector. 
Eurostat: Sector 
Accounts, 
nasa_10_nf_tr; 
OECD: ANA, 
14A 
Own calculations based on 
Eurostat data for European 
countries and OECD data 
for non-European countries. 
 
When Eurostat data were 
not available for early 
years, data were 
extrapolated backwards 
based on the growth rate of 
the OECD series. 
Stockmarket 
turnover 
STO Total value of shares 
traded per year divided 
by the average market 
capitalisation 
World Bank, 
Global Financial 
Development 
Database  
 
Value added of 
the financial 
sector 
VAFIN Value added of the 
financial sector 
relative to total value 
added 
KLEMS  
Property price 
inflation 
PPI First difference of the 
real house price index 
OECD Own calculation 
Household debt HHD Household debt as 
percentage of the 
disposable income of 
households 
BIS; OECD: 
ANA, 14A 
Own calculation 
GDP growth GRWTH Growth rate of real 
GDP 
AMECO Own calculation 
Unemployment 
rate 
U Unemployed persons 
as a share of the total 
labour force 
AMECO  
Union density UD Ratio of wage and 
salary earners who are 
members of a trade 
union to the total 
number of wage and 
salary earners 
OECD: Annual 
Labor Force 
Statistics 
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(adjusted for non-
active and self-
employed members) 
Trade openness OPEN Exports plus Imports 
over GDP 
AMECO Own calculation 
Value added of 
the information 
and computer 
services sector  
ICT Share of value added 
of the information and 
computer services 
sector in GDP 
OECD  Own calculation 
Migration MIGR Change in the share of 
foreigners in the total 
labour force 
OECD Based on data on foreign 
labour force by nationality. 
The series is unavailable for 
the USA where we relied on 
data on foreign labour force 
by country of birth. Data on 
foreign labour force were 
extrapolated using the 
growth rate of data on 
foreign population. 
 
Table A2: Unit root tests 
Variable Fisher type unit root test (p-value) 
WS 0.47 
FINOP 0.70 
FINPAY 0.49 
STO 0.10 
HHD 0.26 
U 0.01 
UD 0.14 
OPEN 0.73 
ICT 0.32 
GRWTH 0.00 
PP 0.03 
VALAD 0.60 
Residuals 0.97 
 
∆WS 0.00 
∆FINOP 0.00 
∆FINPAY 0.00 
∆STO 0.00 
∆HHD 0.00 
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∆U 0.00 
∆UD 0.00 
∆OPEN 0.00 
∆ICT 0.00 
∆GRWTH 0.00 
∆PP 0.00 
∆VALAD 0.00 
∆Residuals 0.00 
Notes: The table reports p-values of Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test with trend for variables in level, 
and drift for variables in first differences. The test is applied to each county individually, and then the test 
statistics are combined to calculate p-values for an overall test. The null-hypothesis is that all cross sections 
contain a unit root. Residuals denotes the residuals of specification (7), which uses the within-estimator.  
 
Table A3: Effects of additional LMI on the wage share 
Estimation method First difference 
FINOP(-1) -2.998** 
(0.034) 
FINPAY(-1) -5.248* 
(0.076) 
STO(-1) -0.198 
(0.275) 
HHD(-1) -0.305 
 (0.768) 
U(-1) -17.534** 
 (0.044) 
UD(-1) -8.993 
 (0.282) 
OPEN -6.909*** 
 (0.000) 
ICT -66.227** 
 (0.049) 
ICT(-1) 53.795* 
 (0.071) 
GRWTH -15.534*** 
 (0.000) 
D-0814 0.422** 
 (0.019) 
BARCOV -0.017 
 (0.365) 
GRR -0.010 
 (0.655) 
Countries 14 
Observations 221 
F-test 13.757*** 
Adj.R
2
 0.451 
Period 1992-2011 
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share. P-values are in parenthesis below the estimation 
coefficients. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All standard errors were 
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corrected for. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. BARCOV is bargaining 
coverage (employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary 
earners in employment with the right to bargaining) adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations 
are excluded from the right to bargain; obtained from the ICTWSS Database. GRR is the gross replacement ratio, 
calculated as gross unemployment benefit levels as a percentage of previous gross earnings; obtained from the 
OECD. Both variables were linearly interpolated between existing years. For GRR, a series based on Average 
Production Worker wages (1970–2005) was extrapolated with the growth rate of GRR based on Average Worker 
wages (2001–2011). 
 
 
 
Table A4: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
WS 64.529 3.885 53.207 75.298 
FINOP 0.852 0.250 0 1 
FINPAY 0.120 0.060 -0.024 0.322 
STO 0.661 0.518 0.010 3.412 
HHD 0.946 0.530 0.071 2.869 
U 0.082 0.038 0.016 0.275 
UD 0.388 0.225 0.075 0.839 
OPEN 0.662 0.301 0.166 1.655 
ICT 0.042 0.010 0.023 0.065 
GRWTH 0.019 0.023 -0.096 0.076 
Notes: The summary statistics are computed for the sample of 14 OECD countries over the period 1980-2014. WS is scaled 
from 0 to 100, while all other variables that are expressed in percentages are scaled between 0 and 1.   
 
 
Table A5: Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between explanatory variables 
 FINOP FINPAY STO HHD U UD OPEN ICT GRWTH 
FINOP 1         
FINPAY -0.277 1        
STO 0.261 0.071 1       
HHD 0.304 -0.572 0.136 1      
U -0.132 0.150 -0.115 -0.239 1     
UD -0.003 -0.190 -0.206 0.184 -0.112 1    
OPEN 0.182 -0.329 -0.241 0.383 -0.231 0.348 1   
ICT 0.249 -0.270 0.469 0.274 -0.218 -0.161 -0.231 1  
41 
GRWTH -0.001 -0.112 -0.012 -0.181 -0.247 0.058 -0.013 0.046 1 
Notes: The correlation coefficients are computed for the sample of 14 OECD countries over the period 1992-2014. 
 
Table A6: Short-run effects of ECM (specification 10) 
Adjustment speed -0.202*** 
 (0.000) 
U -6.456 
 (0.265) 
UD 7.478 
 (0.350) 
OPEN -5.625*** 
 (0.000) 
ICT -27.337 
 (0.431) 
FINOP 2.069 
 (0.268) 
FINPAY -4.848 
 (0.113) 
GRWTH -16.056*** 
 (0.000) 
STO -0.069 
 (0.718) 
HHD -1.375 
 (0.395) 
D-0814 0.040 
 (0.877) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the adjusted wage share.  
P-values are in parenthesis below the estimation coefficients.  
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
